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UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE: INITIAL
FOOD SAFETY RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS,
POULTRY PRODUCTION CONTRACT REFORMS
AND GENETICALLY ENGINEERED RICE
LITIGATION
A. Bryan Endres* and Michaela N. Tarr-
This edition of the food law update will address recent events
that may serve as bellwether signs that significant, long sought
changes to the food and agricultural production system may be on
the horizon. The first section of the update focuses on several gen-
eral food safety initiatives. These efforts may, in the near term, coa-
lesce into comprehensive food safety legislation. The second section
analyzes two food safety actions relating to specific product catego-
ries: oysters and eggs. Section three provides a brief overview of
poultry production contracts that may signal a broader restructuring
of the legal relationships between farmers and the upstream corpo-
rations, which heavily influence production practices. Although
none of the events alone create drastic change, combined they re-
veal a political atmosphere primed for larger restructuring of the
food system. Finally, section four discusses two significant jury ver-
dicts in the on-going genetically engineered rice litigation that im-
poses liability on the developer of genetically engineered seed that
became commingled in the international rice supply chain.
As in previous editions of this update, necessity dictates that
not every change is included; rather, the authors limited their analy-
* Associate Professor of Agricultural Law, University of Illinois, Department of
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USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture, Hatch Project No. ILLU470-309.
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the
funding agency.
** Legal Research Associate, University of Illinois, Department of Agricultural
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sis to significant changes within the broader context of food produc-
tion, distribution, and retail. The intent behind this series of up-
dates is to provide a starting point for scholars, practitioners, food
scientists, and policymakers determined to understand the shaping
of food law in modern society. Tracing the development of food
law through these updates also builds an important historical con-
text for the overall development of the discipline.
I. GENERAL FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVES
A. The President's Food Safety Working Group
In recognition of the growing public concern with food safety,'
and the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report listing,
for the first time, federal oversight of food safety as a "high risk,"'
President Obama established the President's Food Safety Working
Group (Working Group) in 2009.2 Chaired by the Secretaries of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture,' the stated purpose of the Working Group is to
"enhance our food safety systems by fostering coordination
throughout the government including enhancing our food safety
laws for the 21st century."' In the typical aspirational language of
many new initiatives, the Working Group seeks to "break down
stovepipes, address cross-cutting issues and increase coordination of
food safety activities across the U.S. government."'
1. Mary L. Nucci, et. al., The U.S. Food Import System: Issues, Processes & Proposals,
Food Policy Institute Working Paper No. RR-0208-001, at 28(Mar 2008), available at
http://www.foodpolicyinstitute.org/docs/pubs/Final_lmportsReport 3-08.pdf (ci-
ting a study by the International Food Information Council, available at
http://www.foodinsight.org/Press-Release/Detail.aspxtopic-FoodSafetyConcerns_
DoNotInclude Biotechnology).
2. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, HIGH RISK SERIEs: AN UPDATE at 26 (Jan.
2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07310.pdf.
3. Weekly Address, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President
Barack Obama Announces Key FDA Appointments and Tougher Food Safety
Measures, (Mar. 14, 2009) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/Weekly-Address-President-Barack-Obama-Announces-Key-FDA-Appoint-
ments-and-Tougher-F/(announcing in the weekly address the creation of the Food
Safety Working Group).
4. Id.
5. See Presidents Food Safety Working Group, http://www.foodsafetyworking
group.gov/Home.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
6. See FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP KEY FINDINGS, at 5, available at
http://www.foodsafetyworkinggroup.gov/FSWGKeyFindings.pdf.
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As of this writing, the Working Group has announced several
initiatives, but, as discussed below, has not been able to coordinate
passage of comprehensive food safety reform in Congress. On July
31, 2009, the USDA and HHS issued a joint announcement noting
that "prevention and partnership" would guide their respective
agency's food safety efforts.! At the center of the announcement
were new policies by both agencies. USDA, in a change from previ-
ous practice, announced its intention to inspect periodically bench
trimmings' in beef processing for E. coli contamination.' HHS con-
currently announced the publication of three draft FDA industry
guidance documents to minimize contamination in leafy greens,
tomatoes and melons. 0
To actually solve the "stove-pipe" issues identified as one of the
core missions of the Working Group, however, it must go beyond
merely issuing joint press announcements of individual agency ac-
tivities. In October 2009, the Working Group announced a tepid
first step in this effort-a cooperative effort between FDA and the
Fresh Products Branch of USDA to develop new produce safety
rules and a joint outreach effort to assess the impact of these rules
on the industry, including small and organic farmers." As another
example of increased agency coordination, the Working Group
scheduled a public meeting in December of 2009 to improve coor-
dination between FDA and USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service
(FSIS). The goal of the integrated effort is to "increase the speed
and accuracy of traceback investigations and the traceforward" ca-
7. Press Release, USDA, Agriculture Secretary Vilsack, Health and Human
Services Secretary Sebelius Announce new Strategies to Keep America's Food Sup-
ply Safe, No. 0359.09 (July 31, 2009) available at http://www.usda.gov/
wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1RD?printable=true&contentidonly'true&conten
tid=2009/07/0359.xml.
8. Bench trim consists of the pieces leftover from steaks and other cuts of meat
that are subsequently used to make ground beef. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.; available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProducts/ucm174200.htm; FDA,
Guidance for Industry: Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards of Tomatoes;
Draft Guidance, available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegu-
latorylnfornation/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProducts/ucm173902.htm;
FDA, Guidance for Industry: Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards of Melons;
Draft Guidance, available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegu-
latoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/ProduceandPlanProducts/ucml74171.htm.
11. Press Release, FDA, USDA Joins FDA Efforts on New Food Safety Regula-
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pabilities of industries confronting a foodborne illness outbreak."
Finally, at the close of the year, the Customs and Border Protection,
upon the recommendation of the Working Group, opened the
Commercial Targeting and Analysis Center (CTAC) to enhance the
inspection of imported food products." Although the Working
Group undoubtedly has increased the cooperative efforts of the
various federal agencies with food safety responsibilities, one must
defer judgment of the actual effectiveness of this presidential-level
initiative until the coordination efforts solidify into operational
changes within the food supply chain, including an assessment of
the collective government-industry response to a food safety crisis.
The creation of the Working Group leaves unresolved the ques-
tion of which government entity should take the lead in food safety
oversight and establishing policy-or if a lead agency is necessary.
The current shared governance system at the federal level includes
fifteen separate agencies with complicated jurisdictional authority,
as well as fifty states, each with their own statutes, regulations and
agencies." Further complicating the federal allocation of responsi-
bility is the agencies' increased reliance on guidance (rather than
notice and comment rulemaking) and marketing orders developed
by industry, to develop food safety initiatives that attempt to address
evolving threats under existing legislative authority." This fragmen-
tation has led to repeated calls for consolidation and reform.'
12. Press Release, FDA, FDA and FSIS Collaborate to Improve Tracing of Un-
safe Food Products (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm 189311 .htm.
13. Press Release, FDA, USDA and HHS Continue Food Safety Working Group
Efforts; Customs and Border Protection Opens Import Food Safety Center, avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
ucml93668.htm.
14. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY: SELECTED COUNTRIES'
SYSTEMS CAN OFFER INSIGHTS INTO ENSURING IMPORT SAFETY AND RESPONDING TO
FOODBORNE ILLNESS, at 2 (June 2008) available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08794.pdf [hereinafter Food Safety: Selected Countries Systems].
15. A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Pasteurized Almonds and
County of Origin Labeling, 5 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 111, 122-24 (2009) (discussing the
increased use of marketing orders for food safety considerations).
16. See, e.g., Michael R. Taylor, Lead or React?: A Game Plan for Modernizing the
Food Safety System in the United States, 59 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 399, 399 (2004) (noting
that the current system requires "serious modernization" as it is "organizationally
fragmented, bound by obsolete statutes, and unable to make the best use of its
scarce resources to protect the safety and security of the American food supply");
Timothy M. Hammonds, It is Time to Designate a Single Food Safety Agency, 59 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 427, 427 (2004) (noting that the current "patchwork quilt creates in-
consistencies, gaps, overlaps, and duplication of effort that are becoming increas-
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Reform, thus far, has proved difficult. In 2005, a GAO report
and recommendation to consolidate the nation's food safety system"
was met with stiff resistance from key agency stakeholders." A fol-
low up report in 2008 noted that the fragmented federal food safety
system "has caused inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination,
and inefficient use of resources . . . [that] calls into question whether
the government can plan more strategically to inspect food produc-
tion processes, identify and react more quickly to outbreaks of
foodborne illness, and focus on promoting the safety and integrity
of the nation's food supply."" Although the House of Representa-
tives passed a far reaching bill, the Food Safety Enhancement Act,"
the bill has garnered little support in the Senate. Rather, a related
bill that does not reallocate food safety authority from USDA, the
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act-sponsored by Senate Assistant
Majority Leader Durbin, a long time advocate of food safety re-
form-has a more promising future, but remains in the Senate
ingly unworkable"); Food Safety: Selected Countries Systems,, supra note 14, at 2 (rec-
ommending "that Congress enact comprehensive, uniform, and risk-based food
safety legislation and commission the National Academy of Sciences or a blue rib-
bon panel to conduct a detailed analysis of alternative organizational structures for
food safety"); GAO, Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries in Consolidating their
Food Safety System (hereinafter GAO, Food Safety: Exp. of 7 Countries at 24-25
(Feb. 2005), available at http-//www.gao.gov/new.items/d05212.pdf (noting that
the current federal food safety system "could benefit from statutory and organiza-
tional reforms"); but see Stuart M. Pape et. al., Food Security Would be Compromised by
Combing the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture into a
Single food Agency, 59 Food & Drug L.R. 405, 406 (2004) (arguing that the "massive,
time-consuming, and costly merging of two regulatory agencies" would not result in
"a substantial benefit from a food security standpoint", especially in the near term).
A subsequent GAO study of the experiences of other countries, however, tends to
mollify this concern. See GAO, Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries, supra
note 16, at 4 (noting that "government officials in each of the seven countries [sub-
ject to the review] believe that these consolidation costs have been or will likely be
exceeded by the benefits" including "significant qualitative improvements in food
safety operations that enhance effectiveness or efficiency").
17. See GAO, Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries supra note 16, at 24-
25.
18. See id. at 25-26 (referencing agency comments to GAO report and recom-
mendations); see also, GAO Calls for Single Food Agency; Veneman Opposes Consolida-
tion, FOOD & DRINK WEEKLY (Oct 15, 2001) available at http://
www.allbusiness.com/retail-trade/food-beverage-stores/816846-1.html.
19. See GAO, Food Safety: Experiences of Seven Countries, supra note 14, at 2.
20. The Food Safety Enhancement Act, H.R. 2749 (passed July, 30, 2009).
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Health, Education, Labor and Pensions committee-a victim of Con-
gress' singular effort to enact health care reform legislation."
Absent a legislative overhaul, the President's Working Group
perhaps offers a "middle ground" or first step towards coordinating
food safety at a higher, inter-agency level. On the other hand, an
informal "working group" may be more susceptible to the vulgarities
of shifting policy initiatives to satisfy a fickle polity and the needs of
an ever-shorter news cycle. To that end, real reform may require a
formal institution, such as a dedicated agency, with a singular, fo-
cused mission of food safety insulated by at least one institution
from the political winds that chart policy at the presidential level.
B. FDA Office of Food
One step toward this coordinated policy, at least at the individ-
ual agency level, is the FDA's establishment of the Office of Food.
On August 18, 2009, FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg cre-
ated the Office of Food to coordinate the agency's three major op-
erating units relating to food: the Center for Food Safety and Ap-
plied Nutrition (CFSAN), the Center for Veterinary Medicine
(CVM), and the foods-related activities of the Office of Regulatory
Affairs (ORA).' In addition, the Office of Food is expected to co-
ordinate the agency's implementation of recommendations from the
President's Food Safety Working Group and any food safety legisla-
tion developed by Congress."
The Office of Food's "One Mission, One Program" initiative to
unify FDA's foods program has identified ten critical, cross-cutting
topics: preventive controls; risk-based decision-making; inspection
and compliance strategy; import safety; federal/state integration;
incident preparedness and response; science, technology and re-
search integration; information systems; strategic communications;
and resource planning." It will be interesting to see whether the
USDA adopts a similar approach to unify its various food safety
programs and to what extent these intra-agency initiatives and ac-
21. See S. 510, FDA Food Safety Modernization Act. A companion House bill,
Safe FEAST Act, H.R. 1332 (2009), is, as of this writing, in both the House Energy
and Commerce and Agriculture committees.
22. See FDA, Office of Foods: Overview and Mission, http://www.fda.gov/
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companying priority development processes inform the work of the
President's Food Safety Working Group.
C. Reportable Food Registry
In addition to the organizational and structural changes dis-
cussed in the preceding two subsections-the President's Food Safety
Working Group and the FDA's Office of Food-the FDA imple-
mented a significant new food safety initiative to facilitate the track-
ing of foodborne illnesses-the Reportable Food Registry." Section
1005 of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
200726 required the agency to create a registry for firms to report
food safety problems, thereby facilitating the agency's ability to track
patterns of adulteration and better target inspections.
Facilities that manufacture, process, pack or hold food,"2 must
submit a report through the FDA's electronic portal at http://
rfr.fda.gov" as soon as practicable after discovery, but within at least
twenty-four hours," of a food item "for which there is a reasonable
probability that . . . [it] will cause serious adverse health conse-
quences or death to humans or animals."" In addition to reporting
the adulterated food, the Act requires the reporting party to investi-
gate the cause of the adulteration.
Although these requirements include animal feed and pet
food," they do not extend to products regulated exclusively by the
USDA under the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products
25. See Department of Health & Human Services, Food and Drug Administra-
tion, Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers Regarding the Reportable
Food Registry as Established by the Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act of 2007; Availability, 74 Fed. Reg. 46434 (Sept. 9, 2009); see also FDA, Guidance
for Industry: Questions and Answers Regarding the Reportable Food Registry as
Established by the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/
GuidanceDocuments/FoodSafety/ucm 1 65626.htm.
26. Pub. L. 110-085, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350f.
27. FDA, Reportable Food Registry [RFR]: At a Glance, at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/FoodSafetyPrograms/RFR/UC
M181885.pdf.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 350f(a)(1) (defining responsible parties).
29. FDA, Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers, supra note 25.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 350f(d)(1)(A).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 350f(a) (defining "reportable food").
32. 21 U.S.C. § 350f(d)(1)(B).
33. FDA, Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers, supra note 25 (answering
question number 18, "Are animal feed and pet food included in the definition of
reportable food?").
2010] 109
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
Inspection Act or the Egg Products Inspection Act.' This is a sig-
nificant gap in coverage, as the Center for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) notes that "[r]aw foods of animal origin are the most
likely to be contaminated; that is, raw meat and poultry, raw eggs,
unpasteurized milk, and raw shellfish."3  Moreover, foods derived
from or processed with many individual animals to form a batch
(e.g., pooled raw eggs, ground beef, broiler chickens) "are particu-
larly hazardous because a pathogen present in any one of the ani-
mals many contaminate the whole batch.""
Although an important development toward increasing the
traceability of foodborne illnesses within the food supply chain, the
Reportable Food Registry obviously is not a comprehensive system
as it fails to account for most meat and poultry and many egg prod-
ucts. It also highlights the fragmented nature of federal food safety
oversight and lends support to those calling for the creation of a
single food safety agency that would eliminate the jurisdictional gaps
illustrated above. On the other hand, the President's Food Safety
Working Group, in accordance with its stated goal of breaking down
"stovepipes" and increasing "coordination of food safety activities
across the U.S. government"" could use this registry as a tool to
bridge the divide between the USDA and FDA.'
34. Id. (answering question number 22, "Are products regulated exclusively by
the USDA subject to the reportable food registry requirements?").
35. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Foodborne Illness: Frequently Asked
Questions, at 9 http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/foodborneinfect-
ions-g.htm#riskiestfoods (answering the question "What foods are most associated
with foodborne illness?").
36. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Foodborne Illness: Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/foodborneinfections-g.
htm#riskiestfoods (answering the question "What foods are most associated with
foodborne illness?"). The CDC notes that "[a] single hamburger may contain meat
from hundreds of animals. A single restaurant omelet may contain eggs from hun-
dreds of chickens. . . . A broiler chicken carcass can be exposed to the drippings
and juices of many thousands of other birds that went through the same cold water
tank after slaughter." Id.
37. See Food Safety Working Group Key Findings, supra note 6, at 5.
38. To that end, the USDA and FDA have developed a "widget" that tracks all
food safety information from the respective agencies. See http://www.
foodsafety.gov/widgets/index.html. This, however, is a long way from the Report-
able Food Registry as USDA does not require meat, poultry or egg processors to
submit the information upon detection of a food safety issue.
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II. SPECIFIC FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVES
In addition to the general attempts to revise the food safety sys-
tem to be more effective, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
initiated two specific food safety actions in the fall of 2009. One, a
plan to mandate post-harvest processing of Gulf coast raw oysters
harvested during summer months, ultimately led to no actual policy
change. However, it was politically highly controversial and raises
important issues concerning FDA's authority and activities. The
other initiative, final implementation of FDA regulations for the
control of Salmonella Enteritidis in shell eggs, although necessary and
reasonable, adds yet another level of complexity to the multi-agency
regulation of eggs. Both actions are emblematic of some of the
problems in the food safety system that stem from overlapping
agency authority, increased use of guidance rather than rulemaking,
and inadequate scientific and economic foundations for regulatory
decisions.
A. Raw Oysters
In mid October of 2009, the FDA announced a plan to refor-
mulate policies concerning raw oysters." The proposal was to revise
the Seafood Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point standards
(HACCP)40 to require oysters harvested from the Gulf of Mexico
during warm summer months to undergo post-harvest processing to
reduce the presence of the bacteria Vibrio vulnificus." After substan-
tial public uproar in the Gulf coast states," the FDA scaled back its
proposal. The agency decided to conduct an "independent study to
assess how post-harvest processing or other equivalent controls can
39. See Letter from Donald W. Kraemer, Deputy Director, Office for Food
Safety, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation
Conference, Oct. 16, 2009, available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Speeches/ucml87015.htm, see also Michael Taylor, Senior Advisor to the Commis-
sioner, Food and Drug Administration, address at the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation
Conference Biennial Meeting (Oct. 17, 2009) available at http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Speeches/ucml87012.htm.
40. 21 C.F.R. Parts 123 and 1240.
41. See Kraemer, supra note 39; see also Taylor, supra note 39.
42. See e.g. Roger Bull, Florida Oyster Advocates Fuming Over FDA Treatment, THE
FLORIDA TIMEs UNION, Nov. 8, 2009, available at http://jacksonville.com/
business/2009-11-08/story/florida-oyster advocatesfumingover fda treatment0;
Kris Kirkham, Louisiana Blasts New FDA Requiring Oysters to be Sterilized to Prevent
Rare Bacterial Illness, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 28, 2009, available athttp://
www.nola.com/dining/index.ssf/2009/10/louisiana-blastsjfda-planto_1.html.
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be feasibly implemented in the Gulf Coast in the fastest, safest and
most economical way.
1. Background
Vibrio Vulnificus (V. Vulnificus) is a bacterium that occurs in
coastal and estuary waters, particularly in temperate zones." Al-
though it is capable of causing infection through open wounds ex-
posed to contaminated water, it is most commonly associated with
infections from consuming raw oysters." In healthy individuals it
may cause mild diarrhea and stomach cramps, known as gastroen-
teritis, and there have been no reported fatalities from the gastroen-
teritis." However, it is a bacterium of major concern to the FDA be-
cause it also causes septicemia." These infections occur primarily in
individuals with underlying diseases, such as liver disease or diabe-
tes, and almost exclusively after eating raw oysters." With a fifty to
sixty percent fatality rate, this makes V. Vulnificus the most deadly
seafood-borne pathogen, responsible for ninety-five percent of sea-
food deaths in the United States." When it is not fatal, individuals
may develop secondary lesions in which the tissue and muscles de-
velop necrosis and must be amputated.o Despite these percentages,
V. Vulnificus is responsible for relatively few illnesses and deaths
compared to other common pathogens in the foods system. The
FDA estimates that an average of fifteen people die per year from V
Vulnificus infections." Yet as a whole, food borne diseases are esti-
43. Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, Statement on Vibrio Vulnifi-
cus in Raw Oysters (Nov. 13 2009) available at http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnuncements/2009/ucm 190513.htm.
44. James D. Oliver, Vibrio Vulnificus, in OCEANS AND HEALTH: PATHOGENS IN THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT, 253 (Shimson Belkin and Rita R. Colwell eds., Springer, NY,
2005).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 257.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 257-258 (citing W.G. Hlady, Vibrio Infections Associated with Raw Oyster
Consumption in Florida, 1981-1994, 60J. FOOD PROT. 1176-1183 (1997)).
49. OLIVER, supra note 44, at 258.
50. Id. at 259.
51. Food and Drug Administration, Backgrounder on Measures to Eliminate
Risk Caused by Vibrio Vulnificus Infection from Consumption of Raw Mulluscan
Shellfish (Oct. 17, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Speeches/ucm 187014.htm.
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mated to cause "seventy-six million illnesses, 325,000 hospitaliza-
tions, and 5,000 deaths in the United States every year.""2
2. Initial Efforts to Control V. Vulnificus
Prior to 2009, the FDA and states made various attempts at re-
ducing infections by V. Vulnificus. Most notably, the FDA regulates
oysters, as well as all other seafood, by mandating processors im-
plement Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) pro-
cedures. The HACCP regulation requires each processor to "con-
duct, or have conducted for it, a hazard analysis to determine
whether there are food safety hazards that are reasonably likely to
occur."" Furthermore, "food safety hazards can be introduced both
within and outside the processing plant environment, including food
safety hazards that can occur before, during, and after harvest."' Poten-
tial hazards include, but are not limited to, natural toxins, microbi-
ological contamination, chemical contamination, pesticides, and
drug residues." If a hazard analysis reveals that a food safety hazard
is reasonably likely to occur, the processor must develop a written
plan that identifies the hazards that are likely to occur and the criti-
cal control points for those hazards, as well as critical limits and test-
ing procedures and frequency provisions for ensuring the critical
limits are not exceeded at the critical control points.' Processors
must take corrective action when deviations from a critical limit oc-
cur,7 and reassess and adjust the HACCP plan on an ongoing basis."
FDA guidance on the implementation of HACCP advises that
V. Vulnificus is a naturally occurring pathogen (as opposed to patho-
gens associated with raw sewage and human and animal waste)."
Currently, control of V. Vulnificus requires limiting time from har-
52. Paul S. Mead et. al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States, 5
EMERG. INFECTIOUS DISEASE 607 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
eid/vol5no5/mead.htm.
53. 21 C.F.R. § 123.6(a) (2009).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. 21 C.F.R. § 123.6(c) (2009).
56. 21 C.F.R. § 123.6(b)-(c) (2009).
57. 21 C.F.R. § 123.7(a) (2009).
58. 21 C.F.R. § 123.8 (2009).
59. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FISH AND FISHERIES PRODUCTS HAZARDS
AND CONTROLS GUIDANCE [hereinafter FDA, FISH AND FISHERIES], Ch. 4 (3d ed.
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vest to refrigerationi6 Local Shellfish Control Authorities control
for the pathogen by monitoring waters and shutting down harvest-
ing when pathogens are present at dangerous levels."' The Shellfish
Control Authorities may also impose limits on the time between
harvest and refrigeration, depending on the average monthly maxi-
mum water temperature." Shellfish intended for raw consumption
must bear tags warning of the risk of raw and undercooked con-
sumption.' The FDA guide suggests, but does not require, cooking
or pasteurization to reduce the pathogens to non-detectable levels."
In addition to these measures, the FDA has conducted outreach
and education campaigns to try to reduce the consumption of oys-
ters by at-risk individuals. The FDA developed a Health Education
Kit for public health educators to raise awareness of the risk of con-
suming raw oysters and educate consumers about the safe ways to
eat oysters.' The FDA also publishes a National Shellfish Sanitation
Program Model Ordinance (NSSP) to act as a guide for state regula-
tors to implement safe harvesting, processing and shipping meas-
ures.' The Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference (ISSC), an or-
ganization whose members consist of state shellfish control agents
from producing and non-producing states, federal agents, industry
representatives, and academics, attempts to facilitate nationally uni-
form adoption of the NSSP.
In 2001, the ISSC adopted a V. Vulnificus risk management plan
to reduce the number of V. Vulnificus illnesses from raw oysters.
The plan required states that had "two or more confirmed shellfish-
borne V. Vulnificus illnesses since 1995 traced to the consumption of
commercially harvested raw or undercooked oysters that originated





64. FDA, FISH AND FISHERIES, supra note 59.
65. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, V. VuLNIFicus HEALTH EDUCATION KIT
(March, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/ResourcesForYou/Health
Educators/ucm085164.htm.
66. See FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Guide for the Control of Mulloscon
Shellfish (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-
SpecificInformation/Seafood/FederalStatePrograms/NationalShellfishSanitationPro-
gram/ucm046353.htm.
67. A non-governmental organization that was "formed in 1982 to foster and
promote shellfish sanitation through the cooperation of state and federal control
agencies, the shellfish industry, and the academic community." Their home page is
http://www.issc.org/Default.aspx.
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ficus management plan."' The plan sought to reduce reported ill-
nesses (based on data from California, Florida, Louisiana, and
Texas) by forty percent by 2005 and by sixty percent by 2007 and
2008." The plan's broad strategies included improving direct com-
munication with the at-risk community, such as through develop-
ment of educational materials for public health officials, educating
the medical community that treats at-risk individuals through pres-
entations at conferences and similar activities, and developing stra-
tegic partnerships to broaden message delivery, for instance by de-
veloping stronger relationships with pharmaceutical companies that
provide medicines to at-risk populations.
Despite these varied efforts, most states have not seen a reduc-
tion in deaths or illnesses due to V. Vulnificus from consumption of
raw oysters. However, the one state that has successfully eliminated
V. Vulnificus infections is California. In 2003, the California De-
partment of Public Health banned the sale of raw Gulf coast oysters
during the summer months.' Since implementing the ban, Califor-
nia has not had a single confirmed case of V. Vulnificus."
3. FDA Proposed Regulations
The V. Vulnificus uproar started in mid-October, when FDA
proposed requiring all oysters shipped in interstate commerce to
undergo post-harvest processing (PHP) treatments to reduce the
presence of V. Vulnificus.73 The agency intended to implement the
policy changes in the Fish and Fishery Products Hazards and Controls
Guidance, Fourth Edition, which is currently under development.'
The proposed post-harvest processing treatments consisted of indi-
vidual quick freezing (IQF) with frozen storage, high hydrostatic
pressure, mild heat, and low dose gamma irradiation." These tech-
nologies are available commercially according to the FDA, 7 but im-
68. GULF & SOUTH ATLANTIC FISHERIES FOUNDATION, VIBRIO VULNIFICUS ILLNESS
REDUCTION STRATEGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR THE AT-RISK OYSTER
CONSUMER: A STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT, 4, available at http://www.issc.org/
client resources/strategic%20plan.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 5-6.
71. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 13675(c)(5) (2010).
72. See Taylor, supra note 39.
73. See id;.Kraemer, supra note 39.
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plementation cost is unclear. When the FDA issued the proposal, it
did not provide data on the technologies' costs or the projected
economic impact on sales for various sized producers, or the indus-
try as a whole. Consequently, one of the most common objections to
the implementation of the new program was that the costs of the
technologies were prohibitive and the rules would put small proces-
sors out of business." Other objections focused on taste and the
rights of consumers to access foods they want (i.e., raw oysters),78
and the apparent unfairness of the action targeted against oyster-
men when other foods are associated with so many more illnesses
and deaths."
The controversy came to a head in early November when legis-
lators introduced two bills designed to prohibit FDA from spending
money to enforce the PHP standards.' Shortly thereafter, FDA re-
tracted its proposal to mandate PHP and substituted a proposal to
conduct further studies on implementing the PHP."' Congress-
woman Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) subsequently requested the Govern-
ment Accounting Office to conduct an audit of the effectiveness of
the ISSC Risk Management plan in reducing deaths from V. vulnifi-
82Cus.
4. Implications of the Revised FDA Proposal.
This action is noteworthy for several reasons, some of which
raise issues regarding FDA's policy agenda and implementation
strategy. The action is part of the overall effort by the Obama ad-
ministration to improve food safety and raise its importance at the
FDA, as described in Section I, above. Among the various food
safety actions the administration has taken includes the appointment
of long-time food safety advocate Michael Taylor as Deputy Com-
77. See, e.g., Bull, supra note 42.
78. See, e.g., Cain Burdeau, FDA Plans to Prohibit Sales of Raw Oysters from Gulf,
THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct 28, 2009, available at http://www.chron.com/
disp/story.mpl/life/food/6689876.html.
79. See, e.g., Lyndsay Layton, In Raw Oyster Trade, FDA's Proposal is Tough to Swal-
low, WASH. PosT, Nov. 10, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/11/09/AR2009110903339.htmL
80. Gulf Oyster Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4022, 111th Congress (2009); Gulf
Oyster Protection Act of 2009, S. 2735, 111th Congress (2009).
81. Press Release, FDA, supra note 43.
82. Press Release, Congresswoman Rosa L. DeLauro, DeLauro Requests GAO
Audit on Reducing Illnesses and Death Due to Contaminated Raw Oysters (Nov.
17, 2009) available at http://www.delauro.house.gov/text-release.cfm?id=2686.
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missioner for Foods." One of Taylor's most well known actions was
successfully implementing HACCP controls for meat and poultry
production while head of the Food Safety and Inspection Service
(FSIS) at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)."
Taylor's appointment, however, has engendered some controversy
among local food advocates due to his close ties to Monsanto Co.'
Critics fear he will institute policies that indirectly harm small busi-
ness by failing to take into account the unique needs of such entities
in favor of adopting a one-size-fits-all (and that one-size is big busi-
ness) approach.'
Taylor's history, and public perceptions of the implications of
this appointment, is relevant to the FDA's oyster proposal because
the effort parallels Taylor's implementation of HACCP rules for
meat and poultry - shortly after his appointment to FSIS, Taylor
announced he was going to mandate HACCP, and then proceeded
to do so over vehement objections by the meat and poultry industry.
These HACCP regulations are accused of being a primary factor in
why slaughterhouse ownership is consolidated into a handful of
companies, and the reduction in availability of small scale, local
slaughterhouses." Similarly, when the PHP was proposed for oysters,
many advocates declared it would destroy mom and pop busi-
nesses."
83. See Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, Meet Michael R. Taylor,
J.D., Deputy Commissioner for Foods (Jan. 22, 2010) available at
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/OfficeofFoods/ucml96721.h
tm. At the time of the oyster events, Michael Taylor was an advisor to the FDA
Commissioner. See Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, Noted Food
Safety Expert Michael R. Taylor Named Advisor to FDA Commissioner (July 7,
2009) available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnounce-
ments/2009/ucm170842.htm. See also Marion Nestle, Michael Taylor Appointed to
FDA: A Good Choice!, THE DAILY GREEN (July 8, 2009) available at
http://www.thedailygreen.com/healthy-eating/blogs/healthy-food/michael-taylor-
fda-50070809.
84. See Nestle, supra note 83.
85. See, e.g., id. See also Tom Phillpott, Monsanto's Man Taylor Returns to FDA in
Food Czar Role, GRIST, July 8, 2009, http://www.grist.org/article/2009-07-08-
monsanto-FDA-taylor/.
86. Tom Philpott, Monsanto's Man Taylor Returns to FDA in Food-Czar Role, GRIST,
July 8, 2009, available at http://www.grist.org/article/2009-07-08-monsanto-FDA-
taylor/.
87. Food and Water Watch, Where's the Local Beef: Rebuilding Small Scale Beef
Processing Infrastructure (2009), available at http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/
food/report/wheres-the-local-beef-2/.
88. See Kirkham, supra note 42.
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The notable difference between the meat and poultry HACCP
and the oyster plan is that political opposition forced FDA to retract
its oyster plan. Given the political power of the meat industry, why
was USDA able to successfully mandate HACCP, yet the FDA fell
apart trying to institute a small policy change to a portion of
HACCP rules that already apply to shellfish? Assessing and compar-
ing the variables that impacted these two actions is a research ques-
tion that needs further investigation. The answers from the study
could meaningfully contribute to developing legislation that enables
FDA to effectively implement food safety programs tailored to the
needs of various scales of production.
The proposed oyster rules provide another example of the
FDA's increasing use of guidance documents to implement policies,
rather than Administrative Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking." Pol-
icy implementation via the APA has the advantage of clearly convey-
ing to the public the agency's goals and purposes, as well as the
foundations of its decision. This process also facilitates public ac-
ceptance by creating a sense of inclusion in the political process.
In this case, however, FDA provided no data on the economic
consequences and failed to convince the public and legislators that it
had truly pursued alternative courses of action to control the public
health risk from oysters. Furthermore, there was a disconnect be-
tween FDA's characterization of the industry's capacity to imple-
ment PHP technologies and the media's, politician's, and producer's
reactions. Without strong data to support it, the FDA lost its politi-
cal capacity to move forward with its plan. A potential flaw in the
FDA's strategy may have been its decision to take action by changing
a policy guidance document, rather than by progressing through the
informal notice and comment procedure provided by the APA." A
notice of proposed rule, supported by data and the agency's reason-
ing, would have provided the public and impacted stakeholders an
opportunity to comment, and the agency a meaningful, non-political
avenue through which to respond to comments and justify its action.
The FDA, however, missed this chance and instead faced a media
debate.
Yet another issue the oyster action raises is in regards to the
FDA's jurisdiction, which is generally limited to food shipped in in-
terstate commerce.' Although some gulf oysters are shipped in in-
terstate commerce, many are consumed within the state where they
89. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2009) et seq.; See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1966).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2010).
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are harvested. Therefore, the FDA's action may not have had the
significant impact predicted. Without better public information on
where sickness and deaths are occurring, and where the oysters were
sourced, it is hard to conclude whether the FDA's action was worth
the controversy it engendered.
As congress considers new legislation for the FDA, this issue of
the FDA's authority, and the process for its exercise, is important.
Should the FDA's jurisdiction be expanded to intra-state goods, or
should states remain as "testing grounds" for policies? For instance,
the current system has allowed states to experiment with variant
regulatory regimes that provide access to unpasteurized milk, a
product in high demand by some consumers, while generally re-
stricting its availability to the general public.'
B. Egg Handling
Another food safety issue addressed in the second half of 2009
is Salmonella Enteritidis (SE) in shell eggs. On July 9, 2009 the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a final rule, effective Sep-
tember 8, 2009, requiring "shell egg producers to implement meas-
ures to prevent Salmonella Enteritidis (SE) from contaminating eggs
on the farm and from further growth during storage and transporta-
tion.""
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) first recognized SE as a
problem in eggs starting in the 1980s, when it established an epide-
miological and laboratory association between eggs and SE out-
breaks." There are two primary vectors by which eggs become con-
taminated: if a hen has Salmonella it may enter the egg during for-
mation and excretion (the transovaraian route) and through contact
with contaminated materials (trans-shell penetration).' There are
numerous programs, administered by several agencies, directed at
preventing SE infections.' However, the FDA and U.S. Department
92. For a summary of state laws on raw milk, see WESTON A. PRICE FOUNDATION,
SUMMARY OF RAW MILK STATUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODES, available at
http://www.realmilk.com/milk-laws-I.html.
93. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, Stor-
age, and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,029, 33,030 (July 9, 2009) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. Part 118).
94. Id. at 33,031.
95. Id. at 33,032.
96. Among the programs are the continuous inspection of egg processing facili-
ties and mandatory pasteurization of processed egg products, administered by the
Food Safety and Inspection Service, 9 C.F.R. Part 590; the Agricultural Marketing
2010] 119
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
of Agriculture's (USDA's) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
estimate that of the 47 billion eggs consumed as table eggs (as op-
posed to eggs made into egg products), 2.3 million are SE-Positive.'
This translates to a risk of about one in 20,000 eggs.
Although the risk on a per-egg basis is relatively low, SE none-
theless causes thousands of illnesses and hundreds of deaths - esti-
mated in 2001 to be 1,203,650 cases and 494 deaths, while 2004 es-
timates suggested 1,376,514 cases and 427 deaths.' People primar-
ily become ill through eating or drinking food contaminated with
the bacteria." As indicated by the above statistics, Americans con-
sume enough undercooked eggs that controlling the incidence of
infection warrants attention. The FDA characterizes the rulemaking
as "the most recent in a series of farm-to-table egg safety efforts be-
gun by FDA and FSIS in the 1990s.., [it] is the first and only Federal
rule that addresses the introduction of SE into the egg during pro-
duction."'" This "series of farm-to-table egg safety efforts" has been
characterized as the poster-child of a splintered, inconsistent and
ineffective food safety system that unevenly allocates resources.'
However, short of Congressional action to harmonize Federal and
State food safety programs and evenly allocate monies based on risk,
the somewhat ad-hoc yet coordinated attempts of various agencies
to address pressing food safety concerns is better than nothing.
The new rule will require persons with 3,000 or more laying
hens at a particular farm that do not sell all of their eggs directly to
consumers and that produce shell eggs for the table market to im-
plement shell SE prevention measures.o' The measures include de-
veloping a written SE prevention plan that requires procuring pul-
lets that are SE monitored, using a bio-security program limiting
visitors and controlling cross contamination between houses, con-
trolling rodents, files and pests, and cleaning poultry houses be-
Service's oversight and inspections to prevent cracked, dirty, and otherwise unfit
eggs from being sold on the shell egg market, 7 C.F.R. Part 57; the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service's voluntary breeding program to reduce the inci-
dence of SE in laying hens, 9 C.F.R. Part 145 and 147; and the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration's mandatory food safety labeling warning, 21 § C.F.R. 101.17(h). For a
more detailed discussion of the regulatory morass, see Sandra B. Eskin, Putting All
Your Eggs in One Basket: Egg Safety and the Case for a Single FoodSafety Agency, 59
FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 441 (2004).
97. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis, 74 Fed. Reg. at 33,032.
98. Id. at 33,031.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 33,033.
101. Eskin, supra note 96 at 451.
102. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis, 74 Fed. Reg., supra note 93, at 33,034.
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tween flocks if there was a positive SE test.'" Producers must do en-
vironmental testing for SE when laying hens are forty to forty-five
weeks old and four to six weeks after molt;" if an environmental
test is positive for SE the producer must conduct shell egg testing.'"
Producers must maintain a written SE prevention plan as well as
records to verify compliance, which they must make available within
twenty four hours of receipt of an official agency request." Shell
eggs being held or transported must be refrigerated at or below
forty-five degrees Fahrenheit ambient temperature within thirty-six
hours of laying.' This refrigeration requirement applies to shell egg
producers as well as individuals transporting or holding shell eggs.'
There were approximately 2,000 comments in response to the
proposed rulemaking.'o The comments covered a broad range of
approximately sixty issues; therefore this discussion will focus on a
few comments that are relevant to this article's over-all discussion of
food safety policies. Several comments suggested that there should
not be an exemption for producers with flocks of less than 3,000
hens because these small producers have fewer resources and thus
are less likely to have adequate SE prevention measures." The ar-
gument that smaller facilities are more likely to have inadequate
food safety due to limited resources is common, and in some in-
stances may be justified."' However, local food advocates often per-
ceive locally produced food to be safer because of the small scale of
production that allows for more careful monitoring and stronger
personal connections between the end consumer and the pro-
ducer."'2 There are likely many factors that contribute to a produc-
103. Id. (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 118.4).
104. Id. (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 118.5).
105. Id. (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 118.6).
106. Id. (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 118.10).
107. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis, 74 Fed. Reg., supra note 93, at 33,034
(codified at 21 C.F.R. §8.4(e)).
108. Id. (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 118.1(b)).
109. Id. at 33,034.
110. Id. at 33,036.
111. For instance, a survey of health inspections by the Salt Lake Tribune found
that large chain restaurants had fewer critical health code violations than small,
Utah based businesses. Kathy Stephenson, Chain Eateries do Better in Health Inspec-
tions, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Oct. 5, 2009 available at http://www.
sltrib.com/news/ci_13472535.
112. RICH PIROG & ANDY LARSON, CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF THE SAFETY, HEALTH
AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF VARIOUS SCALES AND GEOGRAPHIc ORIGIN OF FOOD
SUPPLY CHAINS 10 ,24 (Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture, Iowa State Uni-
versity, 2007).
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ers' safety record, including scale, finances, general food safety cul-
ture and speed of production. According to commenters and the
FDA, there is a dearth of research on how scale relates to likelihood
of SE contamination."' Given this lack of information, and the very
small portion of the market occupied by producers with fewer than
3,000 hens, FDA felt that imposing the new regulation on the small-
est operations would have little measurable impact on the incidence
of SE."' Although they may be exempt from FDA's (and many Fed-
eral) rules, these small producers likely are still subject to regulation
at the state and local level.
Other comments similarly focused on appropriateness of regu-
lations due to scale and economic costs. For instance, some com-
menters objected to a manure removal requirement because com-
plete removal of all manure becomes difficult in the very large scale
houses due to the complexity of the technologies used."' FDA's re-
sponse stated "we do not understand why manure removal at a large
operation would be impractical. We acknowledge that a large opera-
tion has more manure to handle, but FDA has visited large opera-
tions that do clean out the manure, and we are unaware of any
unique problems for such operations.""'
FDA's decision to completely exempt the small producers, yet
refusal to accommodate the requests of extremely large producers,
raises issues of how to manage problems related to different scales.
Food safety policies need to be flexible enough to be capable of as-
sessing the source of risks posed by different types and sizes of pro-
duction methods in order to adequately control the risks while at
the same time allowing for competition between varying producers
and facilitating consumer access to foods with desired characteris-
tics. The decision to exempt the small producers relates to common
concerns of the local foods movement, including producer ability
and dedication to safety controls, economics and fairness, and over-
all impact on food safety versus per-unit risk. These are many of the
same issues that were raised in the raw oyster debate. Like with the
raw oysters, lack of clear information and scientific standards for
decision making may be hampering effective implementation of
food safety programs.
The oyster and egg actions raise the question of how to direct
FDA to balance competing factors. Should decisions be based on the
113. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis, 74 Fed. Reg., supra note 93, at 33,036.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 33,039.
116. Id.
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risk the food presents, or the risk of the scale of the outbreak, or
some other factor, such as the corporate culture and compliance
history, as well as the scale of the producer? And should economics
play a role in the decision making? Other regulatory regimes, such
as the Clean Air Act, require balancing economic costs against pub-
lic health benefits."7
Accommodating competing scales of production while main-
taining competitive balance goes to the heart of the new poultry
production contract rules discussed below.
III. REVISED POULTRY CONTRACTING RULES
On December 3, 2009, the Grain Inspections, Packers and
Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) of the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture (USDA) amended a regulation under the Packers and Stock-
yards Act"' to improve protections for poultry producers entering
into poultry production contracts."' The changes seek to address
some longstanding abuses in the poultry industry.
In general terms, production contracts are agreements whereby
companies hire farmers for their growing services, 2 0 usually to raise
crops or animals. The company often provides the raw inputs, such
as seeds and chemicals or animals and feed, while the farmer invests
in the equipment and provides the labor. Although production con-
tracts are used throughout agriculture, they are remarkably promi-
nent in the poultry sector.'2 ' In the poultry industry, five firms con-
trol eighty percent of production'2 2 and farmers raised ninety-five
percent of poultry under a contract with a processor.'2 3 In the U.S.
117. For instance, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., bars construction of
new polluting facilities unless they make use of the "best available control technol-
ogy." 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). A "best available control technology" is "an emission
limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of [pollution]... which the
permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environ-
mental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such
facility." 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).
118. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229c (2010).
119. Poultry Contracts; Initiation, Performance, and Termination, 74 Fed. Reg.
63271 (Dec. 3, 2009) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. § 201.100).
120. JAMES M. MACDONALD, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF U.S. BROILER PRODUCTION 3 (2008).
121. Id.
122. RENEE JOHNSON, GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
LIVESTOCK MARKETING AND COMPETITION ISSUES 6 (2009).
123. Id. at 7.
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broiler industry, processing firms called "integrators"2 1 own hatcher-
ies, processing plants, and feed mills. These integrators contract
with independent farmers to "grow out" broiler chicks to market
weight, and to produce replacement breeder hens for hatcheries.'2 1
.Under a poultry production contract, a poultry integrator will
contract with a poultry grower to raise birds of which the poultry
integrator retains ownership. The integrator typically supplies feed,
medicine and other inputs, while the poultry grower provides labor
and invests in equipment and structures to raise the birds.'2 A
30,000 square foot broiler house can cost $300,000, and most grow-
ers have multiple houses.'2 1 Payment structures generally are on a
performance basis relative to other farmers who deliver birds to the
integrator within a certain time period.'"2 Farmers receive a flat base
fee, and those who deliver more meat per chick delivered are paid
extra.'" Consequently, differences in payment are driven by differ-
ences in chick mortality and feed efficiency.'" Chick mortality de-
pends on the health of the chicks delivered, and feed efficiency de-
pends on the quality of the feed delivered. Because the integrators
provide the chicks and the feed, these are factors that are beyond
the grower's control.
Once growers have entered the poultry production industry,
they often have very limited options for selling their birds. Although
only a quarter of respondents to USDA-ERS's poultry production
survey reported only one integrator in their area, fifty-nine percent
of respondents in the 2004 Agricultural Resource Management Sur-
vey reported that they had no alternatives in the form of other con-
tractors, case markets or both, to their current contractor.'2 ' In the
final rulemaking, GIPSA recognized that it is "common knowledge"
that vertical integration and high concentration allow poultry inte-
grators to present poultry growers with "take it or leave it" con-
124. Under section 182(10) of the Packers and Stockyards Act, integrators are
defined as "live poultry dealers." Throughout the article, the authors will use the
term integrator but the reader should be aware that the term is synonymous with a
dealer as referred to in the act and regulations.
125. JoHNsoN, supra note 122, at 5.
126. Id.
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tracts. Because of the lack of alternatives, "poultry growers do not
realistically have the option of negotiating more favorable poultry
growing arrangement terms.""'
The terms of the contracts make poultry production an increas-
ingly difficult profession from which to make a living. There are sev-
eral practices that present particular hardship for poultry growers.
First, poultry growers are often asked to invest large amounts of
capital in building infrastructure for raising the birds without first
receiving a written contract.' Banks make the loans based on letters
of intent from the poultry integrator, often requiring the farmer to
put up their farmland and home as collateral.'" The consequence is
that farmers must agree to the terms of the contracts the integrator
ultimately provides; otherwise, they are at risk of losing their farm
and their home.' As farmers pay off their debts, the companies will
require them to take out further loans to make improvements on
the farm as a precondition to contract renewal, which has the effect
of keeping the farmer indebted and vulnerable.'
Because the farmer lacks leverage, integrators are able to write
onerous terms into the contracts. Payment is often on a ranking sys-
tem that compares growers within a region to each other based on
their success at putting weight on the birds during the seven to nine
week contract period.'" The quality of feed and health of the chicks
are two of the largest determinants of how quickly chickens will put
on weight. Because the companies control the inputs (birds and
feed), integrators can use the inputs as a means of retaliating against
growers who try to organize or resist the companies' control.'" If a
producer performs particularly poorly, they may be placed on a Per-
formance Improvement Plan (PIP) and ultimately have their grow-
ing arrangement terminated.'40 Other potentially abusive terms in-
clude mandatory arbitration clauses, which require costly upfront
132. Poultry Contract; Initiation, Performance, and Termination, 74 Fed. Reg. at
63271.
133. Id.
134. Economic Challenges and Opportunities Facing American Agricultural Producers
Today, Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 110th Cong.






139. Statement of Scott Hamilton, supra note 134.
140. 74 Fed. Reg. supra note 94, at 63272.
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fees for the grower, and clauses that prohibit the farmers from dis-
cussing the terms of the contract with anyone, including family, law-
yers, and financial advisors."'
The underlying cause of the integrators ability to abuse growers
is the vertical integration and consolidation of the industry into the
hands of a few companies. Although the Packers and Stockyards Act
prohibits unfair practices,"' GIPSA does not have anti-trust author-
ity, which limits its ability to address the problems of integration and
consolidation. GIPSA authority is limited to temporary injunc-
tions,"' civil fines,"' and referral to the Department of Justice to en-
force antitrust laws."' Furthermore, GIPSA investigations into indus-
try practices tend to be poorly executed and generally inadequate."'
This situation has allowed the poultry integrators to expand their
coercive practices with little chance of legal or financial repercus-
sions.
Congress has considered various measures to address these
abuses, but few have successfully passed."' For instance, there were
provisions in the Senate version of the 2008 Farm Bill, specifically
Senator Harkin's version, that sought to amend the P&SA to
strengthen USDA enforcement over live poultry dealers, prohibit
confidentiality clauses, and limit processor's right to terminate con-
tracts where the producer had invested more than $100,000 in capi-
tal."' The only changes included in the final bill were provisions al-
lowing producers to cancel a contract within three days; "' requiring
contracts to disclose on the first page that additional large capital
investments will be required;' and provisions intended to give pro-
141. Id. at 63271-63272. Some states have passed statutes prohibiting this and
many other practices associated with production contracts. See 505 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 17/30(2009) (prohibiting complete confidentiality in these production con-
tracts); ARK. CODE ANN. §2-32-201 (2009); IOWA CODE §202.3(2009); MINN. STAT. §
17.710 (2009).
142. 7 U.S.C. § 192 (2006).
143. 7 U.S.C. § 228a (2006).
144. 7 U.S.C. § 228b-2(b) (2006).
145. 7 U.S.C. § 224 (2006).
146. See generally, USDA, OIC AUDIT REYT. No. 30601-01-HY, GIPSA's
MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS PROGRAMS (2006),
available at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/30601-01-HY.pdf.
147. See JOHNSON, supra note 122, at 15-22 (discussing recent congressional ac-
tions).
148. Id. at 18-21.
149. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 11005,
122 Stat. 1651 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197a).
150. Id.
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ducers more leeway in choice of venue,'" choice of law, ' and the
use of arbitration clauses.' The 2008 Farm Bill also requires USDA
to publish regulations within two year to establish criteria in deter-
mining:
(1) whether an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage has oc-
curred in violation of such Act;
(2) whether a live poultry dealer has provided reasonable notice to poul-
try growers of any suspension of the delivery of birds under a poultry
growing arrangement;
(3) when a requirement of additional capital investments over the life of
a poultry growing arrangement or swine production contract constitutes
a violation of such Act; and
(4) if a live poultry dealer or swine contractor has provided a reasonable
period of time for a poultry grower or a swine production contract
grower to remedy a breach of contract that could lead to termination of
the poultry growing arrangement or swine production contract.1
The notice of rulemaking states:
The failure of a live poultry dealer to deliver a written poultry growing
arrangement in a timely manner is considered by GIPSA to be an unfair
and deceptive practice because growers could not otherwise know what
the poultry growing arrangement terms will be or whether the terms ac-
curately reflect the agreement reached between the parties. This prac-
tice could also be considered discriminatory if some growers receive
written poultry growing arrangements in a timely fashion and others do
not. A live poultry dealer's failure to include written notice of termina-
tion procedures in the poultry growing arrangement and failure to pro-
vide a written notice of termination is also considered unfair, discrimi-
natory and deceptive for the same reasons.
A live poultry dealer's failure to include information about Performance
Improvement Plans (PIPs) is similarly unfair and discriminatory if some
growers receive this information and others do not, and deceptive if
growers are unaware that such a program exists until they fail to meet a
minimum performance threshold that was not specified in their poultry
growing arrangement.
GIPSA considers prohibiting growers from discussing poultry growing
arrangement terms with business advisers unfair because growers are
not typically attorneys or accountants. Depriving growers of professional
advice before they commit to a poultry growing arrangement, particu-
151. Id. (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197b).
152. Id.
153. Id. (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197c).
154. Id. at § 11006.
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larly when the live poultry dealers have access to such advice in drafting
their poultry growing arrangements, is considered unfair as well. 55
The new regulations will require integrators to provide growers
with the true written contract on the date they provide the grower
with the poultry house construction specifications and prohibit con-
fidentiality clauses that limits growers' right to discuss a poultry
growing arrangement offer with a Federal or State agency, financial
advisors or lenders, legal advisors, accounting representatives, other
growers who contract with the integrator, and members of the
growers' immediate family or business associates.5 The Farm Secu-
rity and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the 2002 Farm Bill) created a
right for farmers to discuss contracts.'" GIPSA's list largely re-
enumerates the list of individuals that the 2002 Farm Bill protected,
with the addition of the right to discuss contracts with other growers
who have entered into poultry growing arrangements with the same
live poultry dealer.'"5 GIPSA added this class of individuals because
they "see no benefit for a live poultry dealer to forbid its growers
from discussing the terms of their poultry growing arrangements
with each other. To do so would impede the growers' ability to de-
termine whether they have been treated unfairly or discriminated
against in violation of the P&S Act."'"9
The contract must specify whether a PIP exists for that grower,
and if so, any PIP guidelines including the factors considered when
placing a grower on a PIP, assistance provided while on a PIP, and
factors considered when determining whether a grower will be
placed back in good standing or have their arrangement termi-
nated.'" The purpose of this provision is to prevent integrators from
adding PIP riders to an existing arrangement; rather, the integrator
will have to fully disclose the existence of the program before a
grower enters into the arrangement."' Given the large financial debt
often necessary to initiate the growing arrangements, it is important
for growers to fully understand the full range of expectations and
outcomes. This changed provision should help farmers understand
155. Poultry Contracts; Initiation, Performance, and Termination, 74 Fed. Reg. at
63,271.
156. Id. at 63,277 (codified at 9 C.F.R. § 201.100(a) and (b)).
157. Pub. L. No. 107-171, §10503, 116 Stat. 134 (2002) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §
229b).
158. Poultry Contracts; Initiation, Performance, and Termination, 74 Fed. Reg. at
63,273.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 63,277 (codified at 9 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)).
161. Id. at 63,273.
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changes to normal practices that are likely to occur when placed on
a PIP, so they can better judge how it will affect them. 2 This up-
front information should be valuable for growers considering enter-
ing into growing arrangements with large integrators and signifi-
cantly expanding their poultry operations.
Finally, parties to a growing arrangement must provide ninety
days notice of termination of their growing arrangement.'" Integra-
tors must provide reasons for the termination, effective dates, and
any right to appeal.'" It is important to note that this rule requires
written notice for all situations where one party elects to end the
poultry growing relationship, whether it be through non-renewal of
an arrangement, discontinuance of the current arrangement, offer-
ing of new contract terms, and early termination.'6 5 This broad cov-
erage is important because many arrangements exist on a flock-to-
flock basis, which, in the case of chickens, generally last only seven
to nine weeks. This prevents integrators from evading the rule by
simply only offering flock-to-flock arrangements.
Currently, most growing arrangements provide for three to
thirty days written notice of termination prior to picking up the final
flock or prior to the anticipated delivery date for the next flock.'" In
the notice of proposed rulemaking, GIPSA proposed a minimum
thirty days notice.' Many commenters suggested that thirty days was
insufficient for poultry growers to make other business arrange-
ments.'" GIPSA recognized this and the final rule requires ninety
days notice.' GIPSA suggests this additional time will allow the
grower time to "work with the live poultry dealer [integrator] to im-
prove his/her performance, obtain legal and/or financial advice or
guidance, obtain a new contract with a new live poultry dealer,
and/or sell his/her poultry growing business."'" Although ninety
days may be sufficient to allow these events to occur, the reality is
that most growers do not have access to alternative markets, the law
162. Id.
163. Poultry Contracts; Initiation, Performance, and Termination, 74 Fed. Reg. at
63,277 (codified at 9 C.F.R. § 201.100(h)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 63,274.
166. Id.
167. Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, 69
Fed. Reg. 56,824, (Sept. 22, 2004).
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provides limited recourse to demand reimplementation, and the
properties are highly specialized for poultry growing. However, the
market's vertical integration and consolidation, regardless of the
duration of notice given, imposes serious challenges on the termi-
nated farmers' ability to successfully continue their operations.
Although the changes to the new regulation should provide
farmers who have not yet entered the poultry industry with valuable
information, it provides little protection for producers who have
already acquired significant debt and are dependant on continued
contracts with the integrators to pay off those debts. For them, im-
proved information is not going to drastically impact their ability to
negotiate a favorable contract. This improves the well informed,
arms length negotiations of new contracts, but does not address the
fundamental problem of significant disparity in market power and
competitive alternatives, and thus bargaining power. The USDA and
Department of Justice have started investigations into anti-
competitive activities in the agricultural sectors.'' There may be fu-
ture actions that seek to address the larger issues of consolidation in
the marketplace. However, if government wishes to meaningfully
reform power relations in the poultry industry, fundamental
changes in the anti-competitive laws and improvement in USDA's
capacity to investigate and eliminate unfair practices is a necessary
prerequisite.
IV. GENETICALLY MODIFIED RICE LITIGATION
On December 4, 2009, a federal jury in St. Louis, Missouri
awarded two farmers approximately $2 million in compensatory
damages for their economic losses arising from the commingling of
their rice crops with an experimental (unapproved for general culti-
vation) genetically modified rice variety.'" This was the first of sev-
eral test cases brought by farmers and various entities in the interna-
tional rice supply chain seeking recovery from the economic losses
related to the contamination of rice seed stock with Bayer Crop-
Science's (Bayer) LL601 biotech rice variety. In total, over 7,000
rice farmers and others involved in the global rice supply chain have
171. See Dept. of Justice Public Workshops: Agriculture and Antitrust Enforce-
ment Issues in Our 21st Century Economy, http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/
workshops/ag2010/index.htm (last visited Aug. 03, 2010).
172. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., Case No. 06-md-01811 (E.D. Missouri).
For a website containing updated court documents from the rice litigation, see
www.bayerricelitigation.com.
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filed suit against Bayer-5,000 in federal court consolidated in the
Eastern District of Missouri and 2,000 in various state courts." This
section of the update discusses the jury verdict noted above as well
as the court's prior ruling on the consolidated summary judgment
motions of the parties seeking redress from Bayer in federal court.'
A brief summary of the facts giving rise to these disputes follows.
In June 2006, Riceland Foods, the nation's largest rice coopera-
tive, informed Bayer that it detected the presence of genetically en-
gineered rice in the 2005 Midwest rice harvest."' Bayer confirmed
this finding and reported the results to USDA. Although USDA had
approved two varieties of genetically engineered rice for commercial
release-LLRice06 and LLRice62-Bayer had not sought approval for
the LL601 variety.'" Bayer had elected not to market the approved
rice varieties nor to obtain USDA clearance for the LL601 variety
because growers had no interest in producing rice not yet approved
for consumption in the major export markets of Japan and the
European Union. USDA publically announced the rice contamina-
tion on August 19, 2006, precipitating an immediate decline in rice
futures, the pulling of U.S. rice from European grocery shelves and,
not surprisingly, the filing of multiple lawsuits.
173. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 2010 WL716190, 2 (Feb. 24, 2010, E.D.
Mo.).
174. See, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Mo.
2009). Plaintiffs' counsel estimates another 6,000 farmers will have claims in addi-
tion to the approximately 1,000 awaiting trial. In addition to the federal lawsuits, in
March 2010 an Arkansas state court jury awarded just over $1 million to a farmer,
including $500,000 in punitive damages assessed again Bayer. All Business.com,
Bayer ordered to pay farmer $1 million is tab for modified rice, http://www.
allbusiness.com/legal/torts-damages/14079681-1.html (last visited July 19, 2010).
175. There are two primary rice growing regions in the United States-the south-
ern Midwest/Gulf states and California. USDA, Economic Research Service, Rice:
Background, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Rice/background.htm (last visited
Apr. 14, 2010). Long-grain rice, the source of the contamination, is grown exclu-
sively in the South. See id.; see also Nathan Childs, USDA, Rice Outlook and Yearbook
2006, at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/ers/RCS-yearbook//2000s/2006/
RCS-yearbook-12-20-2006.pdf (last visited June 25, 2010). (noting decline in long-
grain exports due to contamination with LL Rice 601); APHIS, Biotechnology
Regulatory Services, USDA Provides Update for Farmers on Genetically Engineered
Rice (Feb. 2007) (describing USDA's investigation of the long-grain rice contamina-
tion), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/biotechnology/
content/printable-version/ia-ge-rice.pdf.
176. A. Bryan Endres & Justin G. Gardner, Genetically Engineered Rice: A Summary
of the LL Rice 601 Incident, Agric. L. & Tax Brief 06-04 (Dec. 2006); See Seedquest,
U.S. Department of Agriculture issues update for rice industry regarding Clearfield 131
long-grain rice seed, (March 9, 2007), available at http://www.seedquest.com/News/
releases/2007/march/18661.htm.
2010] 131
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
The jury verdict, noted above, in favor of two farmer test plain-
tiffs from Missouri was the first of multiple lawsuits against Bayer.
The second bellwether trial of Arkansas and Mississippi farmer
plaintiffs commenced in January 2010, and resulted in a similar vic-
tory for the plaintiffs of approximately 1.5 million dollars.'" A third
test trial involving a non-farmer plaintiff (Riviana Foods, Inc.) will
begin on April 19, 2010. As discussed in more detail below, the
contaminated rice litigation draws heavily from the precedent estab-
lished in the Starlink genetically modified corn commingling events
in 1998-2000 growing seasons, which culminated in the landmark In
re Starlink decision.'" Although without doubt an important event
in the development of case law impacting production agriculture,
the ongoing rice litigation may have a greater impact in the devel-
opment of a common law relating to biotech commingling and
trace-back liability in the discipline of food law by providing an an-
chor point for further litigation and/or regulatory action.
As a starting point for assessing the impact of this regulation,
the following section analyzes the court's detailed October 2009 or-
der accompanying its summary judgment ruling.'"
A. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation SummaryJudgment
Defendants successfully defeated many of the plaintiffs' causes
of action on summary judgment." The court, however, allowed
claims for negligence and private nuisance from the "negligent con-
tamination of the nationwide rice supply" leading to "market losses
and damage to other property, including equipment, land, and rice"
to proceed to trial. Of particular importance to the success of plain-
tiffs' suit was the USDA's current regulatory position on the low
177. See Verdict Lands Farmers Money, STUTTGART DAILY LEADER (Feb. 8, 2010),
available at www.stuttgartdailyleader.com/features/x644563964/Verdict-lands-
farmers-money.
178. In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 841-42 (N.D. Ill.
2002). See also D. L. Uchtmann, StarLink-A Case Study of Agricultural Biotechnology
Regulation, 7 DRAKEJ. AGRIc. L. 159, 160 (2002) (discussing the history of Starlink
commingling and the regulatory responses).
179. See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp.2d 1004 (E.D. Mo., 2009).
180. Id. at 1004-05. Plaintiffs alleged claims of negligence, public and private nui-
sance, negligence per se and violation of the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices
Act. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Bayer for plaintiffs' claims
for negligence per se, public nuisance and violation of the North Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act. Id. at 1004.
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level presence (LLP) of regulated (unapproved for general commer-
cial release) genetic events.
The USDA acknowledges that plant breeding may result in the
mixing of genes and gene products from unintended plant sources,
whether from pollen drift or human-induced commingling."' This
mixing may result in the unauthorized introduction of genetically
modified plant material into seeds and grain.'" Recognizing this
risk, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS),"' in
2002, revised its field testing requirements to prevent the unin-
tended transfer of regulated genetically modified material.'" In the
event of an unauthorized release, APHIS will investigate and deter-
mine appropriate remedial or enforcement actions, if any, required
by the agency or product developer.'" In 2008, as part of a pro-
posed revision of the agency's biotechnology regulatory program,
APHIS announced a change to its LLP response.'" Specifically,
APHIS proposed to establish criteria under which the agency would
not take remedial action for LLP that is unlikely to result in the "in-
troduction or dissemination of a plant pest or noxious weed."' Al-
though APHIS has not yet finalized this proposed regulatory
change, the agency declined to impose remedial action or impose a
fine against Bayer in response to the LL601 commingling.'"
In its motion for summary judgment, Bayer raised the agency's
LLP response to the rice contamination (no action against Bayer), as
well as the agency's proposed LLP revisions to its regulatory pro-
gram. The court, however, rejected Bayer's argument that the
agency's proposed regulatory revisions and decision to forego regu-
181. APHIS Policy on Responding to the Low-Level Presence of Regulated Ge-
netically Engineered Plant Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 14,649, 14,649 (Mar. 29, 2007)(to
be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
182. Id.
183. APHIS is the USDA sub-agency responsible for regulation of genetically
engineered plant material. See 7 C.F.R. pt. 340, (2009) (implementing the Plant
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701-7772 and 7781-7786).
184. Proposed Federal Actions to Update Field Test Requirements for Biotech-
nology Derived Plants and to Establish Early Food Safety Assessments for New
Proteins Produced by Such Plants, 67 Fed. Reg. 50,578, 50,578 (proposed Aug. 2,
2002).
185. Id.
186. Importation, Interstate Movement, and Release into the Environment of
Certain Genetically Engineered Organisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,008, 60,025 (proposed
Oct. 9, 2008).
187. Id.
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latory action served in essence as a federal permit for low-level pres-
ence in the US rice supply.'" Rather, plaintiffs were correct in stat-
ing that the current regulations would not allow LLP.'" Bayer had a
duty to ensure that the GM trait did not "escape and contaminate
other non-GM rice" and this was a "known and foreseeable risk" of
conducting field trials (because federal law required strict contain-
ment, a common law duty arose)."'
This regulatory breach (i.e., LLP), however, did not support a
claim of negligence per se, as the performance standards outlined in
the regulations did not provide a standard of care.'" Moreover, the
court held that both industry practices and the regulatory scheme
are relevant to the standard of care, but the parties cannot rely on
compliance or non-compliance with regulations as evidence for or
against liability.'
With respect to the common law tort claims for negligence and
private nuisance, the court denied Bayer's motion for summary
judgment based on the economic loss doctrine." The court distin-
guished two prior cases involving "the negligent spread of GM food"
in which farmers who had purchased contaminated seed directly
from the seed company could not proceed to trial due to application
of the economic loss doctrine. One case arose in the same court
(E.D. MO) in which the court granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on a poorly documented nuisance claim involving
unapproved-in-EU corn and soybeans.'" The other case involved
Aventis (a predecessor to Bayer) and applied Wisconsin and Illinois
law to bar claims from growers who purchased contaminated seed
(while allowing claims of those whose corn was commingled via pol-
len drift or other means to proceed).'" Although the LL601 plain-
189. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp.2d at 1121-1122.
190. Id. at 1020-21.
191. Id. at 1024.
192. Id. at 1022. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B(2) (1965) (not-
ing that where a statute fails to provide a standard of conduct, the "fact of the viola-
tion may still be accepted as relevant evidence bearing upon the conduct of a rea-
sonable man in the actor's position").
193. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp.2d at 1024.
194. Id at 1016-17. The economic loss doctrine bars recovery of monetary loses in
tort cases if there is not accompanying personal injury or physical damage to prop-
erty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21(1998).
195. Sample v. Monsanto Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092-94 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
196. In re Starlink, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 841-42. The Starlink corn variety had ap-
proval only for feed or fuel use (not food) in the United States. Id. at 834. Testing
by the environmental group Friends of the Earth revealed commingling with the US
food supply and precipitated a massive recall effort by Aventis to direct the con-
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tiffs allegedly purchased contaminated seed, they did not buy it
from Bayer. Rather their harvested crop was "injured by Bayer's
negligent contamination of the nationwide rice supply," which made
the economic loss doctrine inapplicable to their claims."'
B. Punitive Damages
While no punitive damages were awarded in this initial verdict,
Bayer cannot collaterally estop the thousands of other plaintiffs
from having their day in court to seek punitive damages.'" In con-
solidated cases, each test plaintiff seeking punitive damages requires
an "individualized hearing,"'" presumably to provide the defendant
with due process and to give each plaintiff their day in court on the
subject of defense misconduct.
Plaintiffs alleged that Bayer (the successor to Aventis Crop-
Science) and its subsidiaries were responsible for both Starlink corn
and LL601 rice crop commingling, thereby justifying an award of
punitive damages. In denying Bayer's motion for summary judg-
ment on the claim for punitive damages, the court cited disputed
issues of Bayer conduct. For example, did Bayer: 1) ascertain
whether the LL601 field trials were planted too close to foundation
seed, 2) monitor for unauthorized releases of LL601 outside areas in
which it was planted, and 3) verify whether the LSU "cooperators"
were taking necessary steps, such as cleaning their equipment and
boots, properly storing the rice, or adequately documenting compli-
taminated corn to non-food uses. Organic Consumers Association Biotech Firm
Executive Says Genetically Engineered Corn is here to Stay, (Mar. 19, 2001), available at
www.organicconsumers.org/ge/starlinkforever.cfm. Unfortunately, subsequent
testing for traces of the contaminated corn continued for at least eight years. EPA
White Paper Regarding StarLink Corn Dietary Exposure and Risk, 73 Fed. Reg.
22,715, 22,716 (Apr. 25, 2008).
197. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d at 1016-17.
198. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, MDL 1657 (U.S.D.C E.D. La.
Jun. 5, 2007) (awarding punitive damages in "bellwether" test trial to one of thou-
sands of plaintiffs) available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/
Barnett.o&r.pdf ; In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 448 F.Supp.2d 737
(E.D.La.,2006); In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 448 F.Supp.2d 737, 739
(E.D.La. 2006).
199. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 356-57 (2007) (constitutionally
protected defenses include individualized inquiries such as a plaintiffs knowledge);
Cf. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2007) (statistical formulas
are employed to fashion the appropriate remedy).
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ance. These, and other questions regarding punitive damages, will
be heard in future trials.
C. Trace Back Liability
The consolidated LL601 litigation also includes the claim of the
German rice importing company (Rickmers), which is suing for
breach of contract. Rickmers, by suing the grower cooperative Rice-
land, hopes to recover its losses via trace back liability through the
chain of commerce. Riceland, in turn, however, may find its reme-
dies against the originating seed company (Bayer) limited due to the
seed industry's adept use of liability disclaimers in adhesion con-
tracts signed by growers. In the LL601 litigation, the rice grower
cooperative Riceland conceivably could sue Bayer to recover
amounts paid due to the commingling caused by Bayer. This may
prove difficult, however, if the growers in the cooperative purchased
seed with disclaimers of liability from Bayer (and those disclaimers
or limitations of liability are enforced to deny recovery by Riceland
of amounts paid to claimants such as Rickmers). Seed contracts
typically have boilerplate disclaimers of liability for traces of genetic
"off-types," which might include biotech crops that were never sub-
mitted for regulatory approval in the U.S., much less the overseas
markets at issue in the LL601 rice case.
On the other hand, it its LL601 summary judgment ruling, the
court found little reason to hold the handlers such as Riceland liable
for any degree of comparative fault. Bayer asserted that it could not
have caused the harm in question "due to the intervening and/or
superseding acts or omissions of parties or non-parties to this action
for whose acts or omissions the BCS Defendants and Bayer Corpo-
ration are not liable."202
The court, however, held that "[a]lthough plaintiffs still have to
prove proximate cause, Bayer may not argue that others may have
caused the losses.. . . the negligence, if there was any, was in Bayer's
handling of the GM rice that it controlled... . [t]he risk that the GM
trait might escape and contaminate other non-GM rice or other
plants is precisely the known and foreseeable risk that Bayer under-
200. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d at 1031.
201. See A. Bryan Endres, Revising Seed Purity Law to Account for the Adventitious
Presence of Genetically Modified Varieties: A First Step Toward Coexistence, I J. FOOD L.
& POL'Y 131,154-55 (2005) (discussing liability disclaimers in seed purchase con-
tracts).
202. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d at 1024.
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took when it field tested the rice. Bayer's duty included the duty to
assure that those it chose to field test the rice followed proper pro-
cedures."m Accordingly, trace back liability to the seed developer,
similar to the Starlink litigation, appears to have survived the first
stages of the genetically modified rice litigation.
In conclusion, although the test cases thus far have imposed sig-
nificant liability on Bayer, the case may not create a broad remedy at
common law merely for the loss of an export market in a commod-
ity crop. Although that might be a logical extension of the current
case, it is important to note that Bayer's unauthorized release of
LL601 was unlawful when it occurred, even if the subsequent regu-
latory review by USDA removed any duty to conduct a recall of rice
in domestic markets. In contrast, a seed company that is fully com-
pliant with U.S. regulations, and also undertakes disclosure of the
regulatory approval (or lack thereof) of the seed being sold via a
disclaimer in the seed purchase contract, may have less evidence of
negligence than Bayer (with its alleged lack of oversight of its LL601
field trials). Moreover, although in this case the court denied
Bayer's LLP-based defenses, eventual APHIS finalization of a revised
LLP rule that authorizes limited commingling of even regulated
genetically modified plant varieties (i.e., biotech varieties not yet
approved for commercial release) could preclude plaintiffs in the
future from seeking compensation for lost markets via trace back
liability to the seed developer. As a result, it could leave food proc-
essors or others in the food supply chain exposed to breach of con-
tract actions (e.g., breach of contract for failure to deliver food
meeting required purity standards) as they would be unable to re-
cover their losses from the biotechnology company initially respon-
sible for the product commingling.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Unintended components incorporated into the food supply,
whether unapproved GM or pathogens such as V. Vulnificus or Sal-
monella Enteritidis, present continuing challenges to a regulatory
system straining to oversee global supply chains, multiple-scale farm-
ing operations and consumer demand for wholesome, unprocessed
and inexpensive food. With so many facets, the Food Safety Work-
ing Group faces a difficult challenge as it attempts to realign the
203. Id. at 1024-25 (discussing Bayer's affirmative defense for intervening causa-
tion).
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nation's food safety system within the context of multiple non-food
policy initiatives such as health care, financial services reform, global
climate change legislation and immigration reform. As noted in the
opening paragraph, many of these relatively small initiatives dis-
cussed within this article may coalesce into a comprehensive reform
of the food regulatory system from farm to fork. On the other
hand, political realities may impose substantial roadblocks and di-
vert attention to more immediate needs. Nonetheless, the second
half of 2009 witnessed several potentially significant food law issues
with long-term impact.
